5 ways to protect your brain, and boost your career
http://sharpbrains.com/blog/2013/08/30/update-5-ways-to-pro%C2%ADtect-your-brain-and-boost-your-career/
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Intelligent Insights on Intelligence Theories and Tests
Friday, August 30, 2013
Article: 5 ways to protect your brain, and boost your career
5 ways to protect your brain, and boost your career
http://sharpbrains.com/blog/2013/08/30/update-5-ways-to-pro%C2%ADtect-your-brain-and-boost-your-career/
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Thursday, August 29, 2013
Rec CFA SEM books
Why your brain may work like a dictionary - life - 29 August 2013 - New Scientist [feedly]
Very interesting analysis.
Wednesday, August 28, 2013
Article: Scott Barry Kaufman bio, NYU Professor, Cognitive Psychologist, Writer
Scott Barry Kaufman bio, NYU Professor, Cognitive Psychologist, Writer
http://2paragraphs.com/2013/08/scott-barry-kaufman-on-the-brain/
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Article: The brain system that stops worriers just going with the flow
The brain system that stops worriers just going with the flow
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/newsandevents/?id=20614#.Uh6KZNWuXII.twitter
Article Alert: Trait Complex, Cognitive Ability, and Domain Knowledge Predictors of Baccalaureate Success, STEM Persistence, and Gender Differences [feedly]
Shared via feedly // published on JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY - Web of Knowledge // visit site
Trait Complex, Cognitive Ability, and Domain Knowledge Predictors of Baccalaureate Success, STEM Persistence, and Gender Differences
Title: Trait Complex, Cognitive Ability, and Domain Knowledge Predictors of Baccalaureate Success, STEM Persistence, and Gender Differences
Author(s): Ackerman, Phillip L.; Kanfer, Ruth; Beier, Margaret E.
Source: JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, 105 (3): 911-927 AUG 2013
IDS#: 196CY. ISSN: 0022-0663
Author(s): Ackerman, Phillip L.; Kanfer, Ruth; Beier, Margaret E.
Source: JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, 105 (3): 911-927 AUG 2013
IDS#: 196CY. ISSN: 0022-0663
Article Alert: Development and Validation of the German Test for (Highly) Intelligent Kids - T(H)INK [feedly]
Shared via feedly // published on EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT - Web of Knowledge // visit site
Development and Validation of the German Test for (Highly) Intelligent Kids - T(H)INK
Title: Development and Validation of the German Test for (Highly) Intelligent Kids - T(H)INK
Author(s): Baudson, Tanja Gabriele; Preckel, Franzis
Source: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, 29 (3): 171-181 2013
IDS#: 197KR. ISSN: 1015-5759
Author(s): Baudson, Tanja Gabriele; Preckel, Franzis
Source: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, 29 (3): 171-181 2013
IDS#: 197KR. ISSN: 1015-5759
Sunday, August 25, 2013
Article: Noncognitive predictors of intelligence and academic achievement: An important role of confidence
See Beyond IQ and MACM posts at this blog for considerable info related to this study
Noncognitive predictors of intelligence and academic achievement: An important role of confidence
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886913002833
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**********
Mind wandering and "on demand focus" as adaptive skill to be trained
This article is very consistent with the concept of the adaptive nature of "on demand focus."
Click on images to enlarge
- Posted using BlogPress from my iPad
Click on images to enlarge
- Posted using BlogPress from my iPad
Saturday, August 24, 2013
Article: Not all minds that wander are lost: the import... [Front Psychol. 2013] - PubMed
Not all minds that wander are lost: the import... [Front Psychol. 2013] - PubMed
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23966961?dopt=Abstract
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Thursday, August 22, 2013
Article: NoRedInk: A Fun Way to Teach Grammar to Kids
NoRedInk: A Fun Way to Teach Grammar to Kids
http://thenextweb.com/apps/2013/08/22/noredink-theres-an-app-to-help-school-kids-with-their-grammar-in-a-way-that-theyre-going-to-like/
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Wednesday, August 21, 2013
Article: Have We Been Brainwashed By Neuroscience?
Have We Been Brainwashed By Neuroscience?
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2013/08/19/have-we-been-brainwashed-by-neuroscience/
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Article: Sports, Complexity, and the Ten-Thousand-Hour Rule
Sports, Complexity, and the Ten-Thousand-Hour Rule
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/sportingscene/2013/08/psychology-ten-thousand-hour-rule-complexity.html
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Article: Schizophrenia Symptoms Linked to Faulty ‘Switch’ in Brain
Schizophrenia Symptoms Linked to Faulty 'Switch' in Brain
http://neurosciencenews.com/neuropsychiatry-schizophrenia-switch-brain-385/
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Tuesday, August 20, 2013
Knowledge Alert: Journal of Educational Psychology - Online First Publications
APA Journal alert for:
Journal of Educational Psychology
The following articles have been published online this week before they appear in a final print and online issue of Journal of Educational Psychology:
Monday, August 19, 2013
Article: Right Brain, Left Brain? Scientists Debunk Popular Theory
Right Brain, Left Brain? Scientists Debunk Popular Theory
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/19/right-brain-left-brain-debunked_n_3762322.html
Shared from News on Flipboard. Download Flipboard for free here.
Friday, August 16, 2013
Wednesday, August 14, 2013
Article: Preschoolers inability to estimate quantity relates to later math difficulty
Preschoolers inability to estimate quantity relates to later math difficulty
http://www.psypost.org/2013/08/preschoolers-inability-to-estimate-quantity-relates-to-later-math-difficulty-19630
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Working memory as a moderator of training and transfer of analogical reasoning in children [feedly]
Shared via feedly // published on CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY - Web of Knowledge // visit site
Working memory as a moderator of training and transfer of analogical reasoning in children
Title: Working memory as a moderator of training and transfer of analogical reasoning in children
Author(s): Stevenson, Claire E.; Heiser, Willem J.; Resing, Wilma C. M.
Source: CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, 38 (3): 159-169 JUL 2013
IDS#: 185UM. ISSN: 0361-476X
Author(s): Stevenson, Claire E.; Heiser, Willem J.; Resing, Wilma C. M.
Source: CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, 38 (3): 159-169 JUL 2013
IDS#: 185UM. ISSN: 0361-476X
Tuesday, August 13, 2013
Monday, August 12, 2013
Article: Can what you do *before* you write improve your actual writing?
Can what you do *before* you write improve your actual writing?
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/literally-psyched/2013/08/12/can-what-you-do-before-you-write-improve-your-actual-writing/
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Trait complex, cognitive ability, and domain knowledge predictors of baccalaureate success, STEM persistence, and gender differences. [feedly]
Shared via feedly // published on Journal of Educational Psychology - Vol 105, Iss 3 // visit site
Trait complex, cognitive ability, and domain knowledge predictors of baccalaureate success, STEM persistence, and gender differences.
Prediction of academic success at postsecondary institutions is an enduring issue for educational psychology. Traditional measures of high-school grade point average and high-stakes entrance examinations are valid predictors, especially of 1st-year college grades, yet a large amount of individual-differences variance remains unaccounted for. Studies of individual trait measures (e.g., personality, self-concept, motivation) have supported the potential for broad predictors of academic success, but integration across these approaches has been challenging. The current study tracks 589 undergraduates from their 1st semester through attrition or graduation (up to 8 years beyond their first semester). Based on an integrative trait-complex approach to assessment of cognitive, affective, and conative traits, patterns of facilitative and impeding roles in predicting academic success were predicted. We report on the validity of these broad trait complexes for predicting academic success (grades and attrition rates) in isolation and in the context of traditional predictors and indicators of domain knowledge (Advanced Placement [AP] exams). We also examine gender differences and trait complex by gender interactions for predicting college success and persistence in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields. Inclusion of trait-complex composite scores and average AP exam scores raised the prediction variance accounted for in college grades to 37%, a marked improvement over traditional prediction measures. Math/Science Self-Concept and Mastery/Organization trait complex profiles were also found to differ between men and women who had initial STEM major intentions but who left STEM for non-STEM majors. Implications for improving selection and identification of students at-risk for attrition are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)
Sunday, August 11, 2013
Article: Smart enough to know better: Intelligence is not a remedy for racism
Smart enough to know better: Intelligence is not a remedy for racism
http://www.psypost.org/2013/08/smart-enough-to-know-better-intelligence-is-not-a-remedy-for-racism-19561
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Saturday, August 10, 2013
Hunt on the importance of Intelligence course in psychology programs---and suggestions on how to teach it
Very interesting article by Earl "Buzz" on the decrease in courses on Intelligence in psychology programs and his thoughts on how such a course should be taught.
Click on image to enlarge
- Posted using BlogPress from my iPad
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- Posted using BlogPress from my iPad
Article: Kids And TV: Watching An Extra Hour Can Harm Kindergarten Performance, Study Says
Kids And TV: Watching An Extra Hour Can Harm Kindergarten Performance, Study Says
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/09/kids-and-tv-study_n_3728031.html
Shared from Technology on Flipboard. Download Flipboard for free here.
Friday, August 09, 2013
PEBS Neuroethics Roundup (JHU) [feedly]
Shared via feedly // published on Neuroethics & Law Blog // visit site
PEBS Neuroethics Roundup (JHU)
Last Edition's Most Popular Article(s): Love is a Cognitive Enhancer, Mind Hacks Blog In Sickness and in Health - What Jewish Law Can Say about Psychology and Psychiatry, The Neuroethics Blog In The Popular Press Crazy Pills, New York Times...
Thursday, August 08, 2013
Knowledge Alert - PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
> Title:
> Trust, Punishment, and Cooperation Across 18 Societies: A Meta-Analysis
>
> Authors:
> Balliet, D; Van Lange, PAM
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):363-379; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Punishment promotes contributions to public goods, but recent evidence
> suggests that its effectiveness varies across societies. Prior
> theorizing suggests that cross-societal differences in trust play a key
> role in determining the effectiveness of punishment, as a form of social
> norm enforcement, to promote cooperation. One line of reasoning is that
> punishment promotes cooperation in low-trust societies, primarily
> because people in such societies expect their fellow members to
> contribute only if there are strong incentives to do so. Yet another
> line of reasoning is that high trust makes punishment work, presumably
> because in high-trust societies people may count on each other to make
> contributions to public goods and also enforce norm violations by
> punishing free riders. This poses a puzzle of punishment: Is punishment
> more effective in promoting cooperation in high- or low-trust societies?
> In the present article, we examine this puzzle of punishment in a
> quantitative review of 83 studies involving 7,361 participants across 18
> societies that examine the impact of punishment on cooperation in a
> public goods dilemma. The findings provide a clear answer: Punishment
> more strongly promotes cooperation in societies with high trust rather
> than low trust.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 380-394 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400002
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Perceiving Minds and Gods: How Mind Perception Enables, Constrains, and Is Triggered by Belief in Gods
>
> Authors:
> Gervais, WM
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):380-394; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Most people believe in the existence of empirically unverifiable gods.
> Despite apparent heterogeneity, people's conceptions of their gods
> center on predictable themes. Gods are overwhelmingly represented as
> intentional agents with (more or less) humanlike mental lives. This
> article reviews converging evidence suggesting that this regularity in
> god concepts exists in part because the ability to represent gods
> emerges as a cognitive by-product of the human capability to perceive
> minds. Basic human mind-perception abilities both facilitate and
> constrain belief in gods, with profound implications for individual
> differences in religious beliefs, implicit representations of
> supernatural agents, and the varieties of nonreligious experience.
> Furthermore, people react similarly to both reminders of gods and cues
> of social surveillance (e.g., audiences or video cameras), leading to
> interesting consequences in the domains of prosocial behavior, socially
> desirable responding, and self-awareness. Converging evidence indicates
> that mind perception is both cause and consequence of many religious
> beliefs.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 395-411 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400003
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Taking Stock of Unrealistic Optimism
>
> Authors:
> Shepperd, JA; Klein, WMP; Waters, EA; Weinstein, ND
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):395-411; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Researchers have used terms such as unrealistic optimism and optimistic
> bias to refer to concepts that are similar but not synonymous. Drawing
> from 3 decades of research, we discuss critically how researchers define
> unrealistic optimism, and we identify four types that reflect different
> measurement approaches: unrealistic absolute optimism at the individual
> and group levels and unrealistic comparative optimism at the individual
> and group levels. In addition, we discuss methodological criticisms
> leveled against research on unrealistic optimism and note that the
> criticisms are primarily relevant to only one type: the group form of
> unrealistic comparative optimism. We further clarify how the criticisms
> are not nearly as problematic as they might seem, even for unrealistic
> comparative optimism. Finally, we note boundary conditions on the
> different types of unrealistic optimism and reflect on five broad
> questions that deserve further attention.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 412-413 (Editorial Material)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400004
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Introduction to the Special Section on Advancing Science
>
> Authors:
> Spellman, BA
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):412-413; JUL 2013
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 414-423 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400005
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> An Additional Future for Psychological Science
>
> Authors:
> Jost, JT
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):414-423; JUL 2013
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 424-432 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400006
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> PsychDisclosure.org: Grassroots Support for Reforming Reporting Standards in Psychology
>
> Authors:
> Lebel, EP; Borsboom, D; Giner-Sorolla, R; Hasselman, F; Peters, KR;
> Ratliff, KA; Smith, CT
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):424-432; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> There is currently an unprecedented level of doubt regarding the
> reliability of research findings in psychology. Many recommendations
> have been made to improve the current situation. In this article, we
> report results from PsychDisclosure.org, a novel open-science initiative
> that provides a platform for authors of recently published articles to
> disclose four methodological design specification details that are not
> required to be disclosed under current reporting standards but that are
> critical for accurate interpretation and evaluation of reported
> findings. Grassroots sentimentas manifested in the positive and
> appreciative response to our initiativeindicates that psychologists want
> to see changes made at the systemic level regarding disclosure of such
> methodological details. Almost 50% of contacted researchers disclosed
> the requested design specifications for the four methodological
> categories (excluded subjects, nonreported conditions and measures, and
> sample size determination). Disclosed information provided by
> participating authors also revealed several instances of questionable
> editorial practices, which need to be thoroughly examined and redressed.
> On the basis of these results, we argue that the time is now for
> mandatory methods disclosure statements for all psychology journals,
> which would be an important step forward in improving the reliability of
> findings in psychology.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 433-444 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400007
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Advancing Science Through Collaborative Data Sharing and Synthesis
>
> Authors:
> Perrino, T; Howe, G; Sperling, A; Beardslee, W; Sandler, I; Shern, D;
> Pantin, H; Kaupert, S; Cano, N; Cruden, G; Bandiera, F; Brown, CH
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):433-444; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The demand for researchers to share their data has increased
> dramatically in recent years. There is a need to replicate and confirm
> scientific findings to bolster confidence in many research areas. Data
> sharing also serves the critical function of allowing synthesis of
> findings across trials. As innovative statistical methods have helped
> resolve barriers to synthesis analyses, data sharing and synthesis can
> help answer research questions that cannot be answered by individual
> trials alone. However, the sharing of data among researchers remains
> challenging and infrequent. This article aims to (a) increase support
> for data sharing and synthesis collaborations among researchers to
> advance scientific knowledge and (b) provide a model for establishing
> these collaborations using the example of the ongoing National Institute
> of Mental Health's Collaborative Data Synthesis on Adolescent Depression
> Trials. This study brings together datasets from existing prevention and
> treatment trials in adolescent depression, as well as researchers and
> stakeholders, to answer questions about for whom interventions work and
> by what pathways interventions have their effects. This is critical to
> improving interventions, including increasing knowledge about
> intervention efficacy among minority populations, or what we call
> scientific equity. The collaborative model described is relevant to
> fields with research questions that can only be addressed by
> synthesizing individual-level data.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 445-454 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400008
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> The Pervasive Problem With Placebos in Psychology: Why Active Control Groups Are Not Sufficient to Rule Out Placebo Effects
>
> Authors:
> Boot, WR; Simons, DJ; Stothart, C; Stutts, C
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):445-454; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> To draw causal conclusions about the efficacy of a psychological
> intervention, researchers must compare the treatment condition with a
> control group that accounts for improvements caused by factors other
> than the treatment. Using an active control helps to control for the
> possibility that improvement by the experimental group resulted from a
> placebo effect. Although active control groups are superior to
> no-contact controls, only when the active control group has the same
> expectation of improvement as the experimental group can we attribute
> differential improvements to the potency of the treatment. Despite the
> need to match expectations between treatment and control groups, almost
> no psychological interventions do so. This failure to control for
> expectations is not a minor omissionit is a fundamental design flaw that
> potentially undermines any causal inference. We illustrate these
> principles with a detailed example from the video-game-training
> literature showing how the use of an active control group does not
> eliminate expectation differences. The problem permeates other
> interventions as well, including those targeting mental health,
> cognition, and educational achievement. Fortunately, measuring
> expectations and adopting alternative experimental designs makes it
> possible to control for placebo effects, thereby increasing confidence
> in the causal efficacy of psychological interventions.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 455-473 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400009
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> How "Paternalistic" Is Spatial Perception? Why Wearing a Heavy Backpack Doesn't- and Couldn't-Make Hills Look Steeper
>
> Authors:
> Firestone, C
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):455-473; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> A chief goal of perception is to help us navigate our environment.
> According to a rich and ambitious theory of spatial perception, the
> visual system achieves this goal not by aiming to accurately depict the
> external world, but instead by actively distorting the environment's
> perceived spatial layout to bias action selection toward favorable
> outcomes. Scores of experimental results have supported this
> viewincluding, famously, a report that wearing a heavy backpack makes
> hills look steeper. This perspective portrays the visual system as
> unapologetically paternalistic: Backpacks make hills harder to climb, so
> vision steepens them to discourage ascent. The paternalistic theory of
> spatial perception has, understandably, attracted controversy; if true,
> it would radically revise our understanding of how and why we see. Here,
> this view is subjected to a kind and degree of scrutiny it has yet to
> face. After characterizing and motivating the case for paternalistic
> vision, I expose several unexplored defects in its theoretical
> framework, arguing that extant accounts of how and why spatial
> perception is ability-sensitive are deeply problematic and that
> perceptual phenomenology belies the view's claims. The paternalistic
> account of spatial perception not only isn't trueit couldn't be true,
> even if its empirical findings were accepted at face value.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 474-483 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400010
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> An Embodied Approach to Perception: By What Units Are Visual Perceptions Scaled?
>
> Authors:
> Proffitt, DR
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):474-483; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> When humans perceive the environment, angular units of visual
> information must be transformed into units appropriate for the
> specification of such parameters of surface layout as extent, size, and
> orientation. Our embodied approach to perception proposes that these
> scaling units derive from the body. For example, hand size is relevant
> for scaling the size of a strawberry, whereas an extent across a meadow
> is scaled by the amount of walking required to traverse it. In his
> article, Firestone (2013, this issue) argued that our approach is wrong;
> in fact, he argued that it must be wrong. This reply to Firestone's
> critique is organized into three parts, which address the following
> questions: (a) What is the fundamental question motivating our approach?
> (b) How does our approach answer this question? (c) How can we address
> Firestone's arguments against our approach? A point-by-point critique of
> Firestone's arguments is presented. Three conclusions are drawn: (a)
> Most of Firestone's arguments reflect a misunderstanding of our
> approach, (b) none of his arguments are the fatal flaws in our approach
> that he believes them to be, and (c) there are good reasons to believe
> that perception-just like any other biological function-is a phenotypic
> expression.
>
>
>
> Trust, Punishment, and Cooperation Across 18 Societies: A Meta-Analysis
>
> Authors:
> Balliet, D; Van Lange, PAM
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):363-379; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Punishment promotes contributions to public goods, but recent evidence
> suggests that its effectiveness varies across societies. Prior
> theorizing suggests that cross-societal differences in trust play a key
> role in determining the effectiveness of punishment, as a form of social
> norm enforcement, to promote cooperation. One line of reasoning is that
> punishment promotes cooperation in low-trust societies, primarily
> because people in such societies expect their fellow members to
> contribute only if there are strong incentives to do so. Yet another
> line of reasoning is that high trust makes punishment work, presumably
> because in high-trust societies people may count on each other to make
> contributions to public goods and also enforce norm violations by
> punishing free riders. This poses a puzzle of punishment: Is punishment
> more effective in promoting cooperation in high- or low-trust societies?
> In the present article, we examine this puzzle of punishment in a
> quantitative review of 83 studies involving 7,361 participants across 18
> societies that examine the impact of punishment on cooperation in a
> public goods dilemma. The findings provide a clear answer: Punishment
> more strongly promotes cooperation in societies with high trust rather
> than low trust.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 380-394 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400002
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Perceiving Minds and Gods: How Mind Perception Enables, Constrains, and Is Triggered by Belief in Gods
>
> Authors:
> Gervais, WM
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):380-394; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Most people believe in the existence of empirically unverifiable gods.
> Despite apparent heterogeneity, people's conceptions of their gods
> center on predictable themes. Gods are overwhelmingly represented as
> intentional agents with (more or less) humanlike mental lives. This
> article reviews converging evidence suggesting that this regularity in
> god concepts exists in part because the ability to represent gods
> emerges as a cognitive by-product of the human capability to perceive
> minds. Basic human mind-perception abilities both facilitate and
> constrain belief in gods, with profound implications for individual
> differences in religious beliefs, implicit representations of
> supernatural agents, and the varieties of nonreligious experience.
> Furthermore, people react similarly to both reminders of gods and cues
> of social surveillance (e.g., audiences or video cameras), leading to
> interesting consequences in the domains of prosocial behavior, socially
> desirable responding, and self-awareness. Converging evidence indicates
> that mind perception is both cause and consequence of many religious
> beliefs.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 395-411 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400003
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Taking Stock of Unrealistic Optimism
>
> Authors:
> Shepperd, JA; Klein, WMP; Waters, EA; Weinstein, ND
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):395-411; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Researchers have used terms such as unrealistic optimism and optimistic
> bias to refer to concepts that are similar but not synonymous. Drawing
> from 3 decades of research, we discuss critically how researchers define
> unrealistic optimism, and we identify four types that reflect different
> measurement approaches: unrealistic absolute optimism at the individual
> and group levels and unrealistic comparative optimism at the individual
> and group levels. In addition, we discuss methodological criticisms
> leveled against research on unrealistic optimism and note that the
> criticisms are primarily relevant to only one type: the group form of
> unrealistic comparative optimism. We further clarify how the criticisms
> are not nearly as problematic as they might seem, even for unrealistic
> comparative optimism. Finally, we note boundary conditions on the
> different types of unrealistic optimism and reflect on five broad
> questions that deserve further attention.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 412-413 (Editorial Material)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400004
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Introduction to the Special Section on Advancing Science
>
> Authors:
> Spellman, BA
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):412-413; JUL 2013
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 414-423 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400005
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> An Additional Future for Psychological Science
>
> Authors:
> Jost, JT
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):414-423; JUL 2013
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 424-432 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400006
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> PsychDisclosure.org: Grassroots Support for Reforming Reporting Standards in Psychology
>
> Authors:
> Lebel, EP; Borsboom, D; Giner-Sorolla, R; Hasselman, F; Peters, KR;
> Ratliff, KA; Smith, CT
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):424-432; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> There is currently an unprecedented level of doubt regarding the
> reliability of research findings in psychology. Many recommendations
> have been made to improve the current situation. In this article, we
> report results from PsychDisclosure.org, a novel open-science initiative
> that provides a platform for authors of recently published articles to
> disclose four methodological design specification details that are not
> required to be disclosed under current reporting standards but that are
> critical for accurate interpretation and evaluation of reported
> findings. Grassroots sentimentas manifested in the positive and
> appreciative response to our initiativeindicates that psychologists want
> to see changes made at the systemic level regarding disclosure of such
> methodological details. Almost 50% of contacted researchers disclosed
> the requested design specifications for the four methodological
> categories (excluded subjects, nonreported conditions and measures, and
> sample size determination). Disclosed information provided by
> participating authors also revealed several instances of questionable
> editorial practices, which need to be thoroughly examined and redressed.
> On the basis of these results, we argue that the time is now for
> mandatory methods disclosure statements for all psychology journals,
> which would be an important step forward in improving the reliability of
> findings in psychology.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 433-444 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400007
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Advancing Science Through Collaborative Data Sharing and Synthesis
>
> Authors:
> Perrino, T; Howe, G; Sperling, A; Beardslee, W; Sandler, I; Shern, D;
> Pantin, H; Kaupert, S; Cano, N; Cruden, G; Bandiera, F; Brown, CH
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):433-444; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The demand for researchers to share their data has increased
> dramatically in recent years. There is a need to replicate and confirm
> scientific findings to bolster confidence in many research areas. Data
> sharing also serves the critical function of allowing synthesis of
> findings across trials. As innovative statistical methods have helped
> resolve barriers to synthesis analyses, data sharing and synthesis can
> help answer research questions that cannot be answered by individual
> trials alone. However, the sharing of data among researchers remains
> challenging and infrequent. This article aims to (a) increase support
> for data sharing and synthesis collaborations among researchers to
> advance scientific knowledge and (b) provide a model for establishing
> these collaborations using the example of the ongoing National Institute
> of Mental Health's Collaborative Data Synthesis on Adolescent Depression
> Trials. This study brings together datasets from existing prevention and
> treatment trials in adolescent depression, as well as researchers and
> stakeholders, to answer questions about for whom interventions work and
> by what pathways interventions have their effects. This is critical to
> improving interventions, including increasing knowledge about
> intervention efficacy among minority populations, or what we call
> scientific equity. The collaborative model described is relevant to
> fields with research questions that can only be addressed by
> synthesizing individual-level data.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 445-454 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400008
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> The Pervasive Problem With Placebos in Psychology: Why Active Control Groups Are Not Sufficient to Rule Out Placebo Effects
>
> Authors:
> Boot, WR; Simons, DJ; Stothart, C; Stutts, C
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):445-454; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> To draw causal conclusions about the efficacy of a psychological
> intervention, researchers must compare the treatment condition with a
> control group that accounts for improvements caused by factors other
> than the treatment. Using an active control helps to control for the
> possibility that improvement by the experimental group resulted from a
> placebo effect. Although active control groups are superior to
> no-contact controls, only when the active control group has the same
> expectation of improvement as the experimental group can we attribute
> differential improvements to the potency of the treatment. Despite the
> need to match expectations between treatment and control groups, almost
> no psychological interventions do so. This failure to control for
> expectations is not a minor omissionit is a fundamental design flaw that
> potentially undermines any causal inference. We illustrate these
> principles with a detailed example from the video-game-training
> literature showing how the use of an active control group does not
> eliminate expectation differences. The problem permeates other
> interventions as well, including those targeting mental health,
> cognition, and educational achievement. Fortunately, measuring
> expectations and adopting alternative experimental designs makes it
> possible to control for placebo effects, thereby increasing confidence
> in the causal efficacy of psychological interventions.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 455-473 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400009
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> How "Paternalistic" Is Spatial Perception? Why Wearing a Heavy Backpack Doesn't- and Couldn't-Make Hills Look Steeper
>
> Authors:
> Firestone, C
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):455-473; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> A chief goal of perception is to help us navigate our environment.
> According to a rich and ambitious theory of spatial perception, the
> visual system achieves this goal not by aiming to accurately depict the
> external world, but instead by actively distorting the environment's
> perceived spatial layout to bias action selection toward favorable
> outcomes. Scores of experimental results have supported this
> viewincluding, famously, a report that wearing a heavy backpack makes
> hills look steeper. This perspective portrays the visual system as
> unapologetically paternalistic: Backpacks make hills harder to climb, so
> vision steepens them to discourage ascent. The paternalistic theory of
> spatial perception has, understandably, attracted controversy; if true,
> it would radically revise our understanding of how and why we see. Here,
> this view is subjected to a kind and degree of scrutiny it has yet to
> face. After characterizing and motivating the case for paternalistic
> vision, I expose several unexplored defects in its theoretical
> framework, arguing that extant accounts of how and why spatial
> perception is ability-sensitive are deeply problematic and that
> perceptual phenomenology belies the view's claims. The paternalistic
> account of spatial perception not only isn't trueit couldn't be true,
> even if its empirical findings were accepted at face value.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 474-483 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400010
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> An Embodied Approach to Perception: By What Units Are Visual Perceptions Scaled?
>
> Authors:
> Proffitt, DR
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):474-483; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> When humans perceive the environment, angular units of visual
> information must be transformed into units appropriate for the
> specification of such parameters of surface layout as extent, size, and
> orientation. Our embodied approach to perception proposes that these
> scaling units derive from the body. For example, hand size is relevant
> for scaling the size of a strawberry, whereas an extent across a meadow
> is scaled by the amount of walking required to traverse it. In his
> article, Firestone (2013, this issue) argued that our approach is wrong;
> in fact, he argued that it must be wrong. This reply to Firestone's
> critique is organized into three parts, which address the following
> questions: (a) What is the fundamental question motivating our approach?
> (b) How does our approach answer this question? (c) How can we address
> Firestone's arguments against our approach? A point-by-point critique of
> Firestone's arguments is presented. Three conclusions are drawn: (a)
> Most of Firestone's arguments reflect a misunderstanding of our
> approach, (b) none of his arguments are the fatal flaws in our approach
> that he believes them to be, and (c) there are good reasons to believe
> that perception-just like any other biological function-is a phenotypic
> expression.
>
>
>
Knowledge AlertJOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
*******************************************
Kevin McGrew, PhD
Educational Psychologist
Director, IAP
www.themindhub.com
*******************************************
>
>
> *Pages: 131-138 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300001
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Mental models and cognitive change
>
> Authors:
> Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):131-138; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The theory of mental models owes its origins to Peirce's logic in the
> nineteenth century and to Craik's psychological research during the
> Second World War. This Special Issue marks the 30th anniversary of a
> book that tried to pull these and other strands together into a unified
> approach to comprehension and reasoning: Mental Models. The principal
> assumption of the theory is that individuals reason by trying to
> envisage the possibilities compatible with what they know or believe.
> The present paper reviews recent developments in the theory. It
> describes the issues that arise as a result of cognitive changes both in
> the short term and in the long term. And it introduces the set of papers
> in this Special Issue that explore such changes in mind.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 139-146 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300002
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive changes from explanations
>
> Authors:
> Khemlani, S; Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):139-146; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> When individuals detect that a description is inconsistent, theorists
> from William James onwards have argued that a cognitive change occurs:
> They modify the description in a minimal way to make it consistent. We
> present an alternative hypothesis: Reasoners create an explanation that
> resolves the inconsistency, and the explanation entails a revision or
> reinterpretation of the description. According to this principle of
> resolution, revision is consequent upon explanation. Hence, when
> individuals have such an explanation in mind, they should be faster than
> otherwise to modify assertions to make them consistent. Two experiments
> corroborated this prediction.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 147-156 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300003
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Spatial belief revision
>
> Authors:
> Knauff, M; Bucher, L; Krumnack, A; Nejasmic, J
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):147-156; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Belief revision is the process of changing one's beliefs when a newly
> acquired fact contradicts the existing belief set. Psychological
> research on belief revision mostly used conditional reasoning problems
> in which an inconsistency arises between a fact, contradicting a valid
> conclusion, and the conditional and categorical premises. In this paper,
> we present a new experimental paradigm in which we explore how people
> change their mind about the location of objects in space. The
> participants received statements that described the spatial relations
> between a set of objects. From these premises they drew a conclusion
> which then, in the next step, was contradicted by a new, irrefutable
> fact. The participants' task was to decide which of the objects to
> relocate and which one to leave at its initial position. We hypothesised
> that this spatial revision process is based on mental models and is
> affected by the functional asymmetry between reference objects (RO) and
> the located objects (LO) of spatial relations. The results from two
> experiments corroborate this hypothesis. We found that individuals have
> a strong preference to relocate the LO of the premises, but avoid
> relocating the RO. This is a novel finding and opens up new avenues of
> research on how humans mentally revise their beliefs about spatial
> relations between entities in the world.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 157-164 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300004
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Models and cognitive change in psychopathology
>
> Authors:
> Gangemi, A; Mancini, F; Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):157-164; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The hyper-emotion theory attributes psychological illnesses to emotions
> of aberrant intensity, which in turn prompt better reasoning about their
> causes. Two experiments in which participants drew their own conclusions
> from syllogistic premises tested this prediction. Individuals from the
> same populations as the experimental participants rated the
> believability of likely conclusions. One experiment compared patients
> with depression with controls, and the other experiment compared
> students scoring high on anxiety with controls. Controls tended to draw
> believable conclusions and not to draw unbelievable conclusions, and
> this belief bias was greater for invalid inferences. The clinical groups
> were better reasoners than the controls, and did not show belief bias.
> As our hypothesis predicted, they drew many more valid conclusions
> concerning their illness than controls drew valid believable
> conclusions. But, contrary to the hypothesis, they refrained from
> drawing invalid conclusions about neutral topics more than controls
> refrained from drawing invalid unbelievable conclusions.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 165-173 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300005
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Strategic changes in problem solving
>
> Authors:
> Lee, NYL; Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):165-173; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> One way to study how individuals reason to solve problems is to see how
> they develop strategies to solve a series of related problems. This
> paper accordingly presents a theory explaining how they do so: When
> individuals solve a series of problems, their initial moves are
> constrained solely by perceptual and cognitive characteristics of the
> problems. They deduce the consequences of tactical moves, whether or not
> these moves are successful in advancing them towards a solution. As they
> master these tactics, however, a strategic shift occurs. The deduced
> knowledge comes to constrain the generation of moves, through the
> discovery of global constraints. Three experiments investigating a
> series of matchstick problems corroborated the theory.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 174-182 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300006
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Chronometric evidence for the dual-process mental model theory of conditional
>
> Authors:
> Vergauwe, E; Gauffroy, C; Morsanyi, K; Dagry, I; Barrouillet, P
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):174-182; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The fact that adults exhibit a defective truth table when evaluating If
> p then q conditional statement and judge not signp cases as irrelevant
> for the truth value of the conditional has been considered as one of the
> main evidence against the mental model theory and in favour of Evans'
> (2007) suppositional account of conditional. If judgements of
> irrelevance result from some heuristic process, as the suppositional
> theory assumes, they should be rapid. By contrast, if they result from a
> demanding and time consuming fleshing out process, as our mental model
> theory assumes, irrelevant responses should be the slowest. In the
> present study, we analyse the time course of responses in a truth table
> task as a function of their nature and the interpretation of the
> conditional adopted by the participants. As our mental model theory
> predicts, irrelevant responses are the slowest, and response times are a
> direct function of the number of models each type of response involves.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 183-191 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300007
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Microgenetic evidence for the beneficial effects of feedback and practice on belief bias
>
> Authors:
> Ball, LJ
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):183-191; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its
> believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. The
> present study examined how belief bias might be ameliorated by providing
> evaluative feedback on responses (i.e., simple correct/incorrect
> assessments). The research utilised a microgenetic method involving
> intensive reasoning with belief-oriented syllogisms over a condensed
> time period (four testing sessions over consecutive days) so as to
> afford an understanding of the cognitive changes arising from the
> provision of evaluative feedback versus opportunities for mere practice.
> Belief bias was markedly reduced in the feedback condition relative to
> the no-feedback (practice) condition. However, logical responding
> improved over time for both conditions, indicating that normative
> evaluations can benefit from mere practice with belief-oriented
> deductive problems. Overall, the data support dual-process theories of
> belief bias, which embody analytic processes that can be modulated by
> external factors such as the provision of evaluative feedback.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 192-200 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300008
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Deductive reasoning and metalogical knowledge in preadolescence: A mental model appraisal
>
> Authors:
> Santamaria, C; Tse, PP; Moreno-Rios, S; Garcia-Madruga, JA
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):192-200; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> In this paper we analysed the metalogical and deductive inferential
> ability of a wide sample (1118 participants) of seventh and eighth grade
> school students (12-13 years old). We used two metareasoning tasks: an
> evaluation of propositional attitudes and a modal syllogistic task. Two
> additional deductive (propositional and syllogistic) reasoning tasks
> were used: a propositional inference task and a syllogistic construction
> task. We also tested the participants' working memory spans with the
> Reading Span test (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). We found a reliable
> effect of working memory for all the tasks, but an effect of school
> grade only for the metareasoning tasks. The results support the idea
> that metareasoning competencies make unusual progress during
> preadolescence. This development is crucial for individuals to engage in
> analytical reasoning.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 201-209 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300009
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive change in learning from text: Gesturing enhances the construction of the text mental model
>
> Authors:
> Cutica, I; Bucciarelli, M
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):201-209; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The literature on co-speech gestures has revealed a facilitating effect
> of gestures on both the listener's discourse comprehension and memory,
> and the speaker's discourse production. Bucciarelli (2007) and Cutica
> and Bucciarelli (2008) advanced a mental model account for the cognitive
> change produced by gestures: Gestures, whether observed or produced,
> favour the construction of a mental model of the discourse they
> accompany. In this paper, we focus on gesturing while studying, assuming
> that gesturing while reading a text also favours the construction of a
> mental model of the text. In two experiments we invited adult
> participants to study two scientific texts and confirmed the predictions
> deriving from the assumption that gestures favour the construction of a
> mental model of the text: Gesturing while studying resulted in more
> correct recollections and text-based inferences (Experiment 1) and loss
> of verbatim recall (Experiment 2).
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 210-219 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300010
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive change in insight problem solving: Initial model errors and counterexamples
>
> Authors:
> Murray, MA; Byrne, RMJ
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):210-219; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> We report the results of four experiments that examined the cognitive
> changes that occur in problem solvers' mental models of insight
> problems. The experiments showed that participants produced more correct
> solutions to insight problems that required single steps than multiple
> steps. Experiment 1 showed that their diagrams and explanations
> corresponded to initial model errors. Experiment 2 found more correct
> solutions for problems reworded to enable the retrieval of
> counterexamples to common assumptions. Experiment 3 found more correct
> solutions when physical props enabled the construction of a
> counterexample to the initial erroneous model and also to subsequent
> erroneous models. Experiment 4 showed more correct solutions when
> physical props limited the subsequent possibilities. The implications of
> the results for alternative theories of insight problem solving are
> discussed.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 220-228 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300011
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive change in mental models with experience in the domain of organic chemistry
>
> Authors:
> Hegarty, M; Stieff, M; Dixon, BL
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):220-228; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> We examined cognitive change in students' mental models, and
> consequently their problem-solving strategies, as a result of
> instruction in the domain of organic chemistry. Three groups of students
> received organic chemistry instruction that emphasised either imagistic
> strategies, analytic problem-solving strategies, or their combination.
> Before instruction, students' solution strategies were largely
> imagistic. After instruction, imagistic strategies comprised a minority
> of the strategies reported, indicating a switch from analogue mental
> models to more abstract representations. This switch was moderated by
> instruction and ability such that students who received analytic
> instruction used more analytic strategies after instruction and students
> with higher spatial ability used more imagistic strategies after
> instruction. Problem-solving success was associated with using a greater
> range of strategies. These results are consistent with research in other
> domains suggesting that imagistic mental models are associated with
> novelty, and as students gain more experience in a domain, they adopt
> domain-specific heuristics and rules when possible.
>
>
Kevin McGrew, PhD
Educational Psychologist
Director, IAP
www.themindhub.com
*******************************************
>
>
> *Pages: 131-138 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300001
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Mental models and cognitive change
>
> Authors:
> Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):131-138; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The theory of mental models owes its origins to Peirce's logic in the
> nineteenth century and to Craik's psychological research during the
> Second World War. This Special Issue marks the 30th anniversary of a
> book that tried to pull these and other strands together into a unified
> approach to comprehension and reasoning: Mental Models. The principal
> assumption of the theory is that individuals reason by trying to
> envisage the possibilities compatible with what they know or believe.
> The present paper reviews recent developments in the theory. It
> describes the issues that arise as a result of cognitive changes both in
> the short term and in the long term. And it introduces the set of papers
> in this Special Issue that explore such changes in mind.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 139-146 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300002
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive changes from explanations
>
> Authors:
> Khemlani, S; Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):139-146; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> When individuals detect that a description is inconsistent, theorists
> from William James onwards have argued that a cognitive change occurs:
> They modify the description in a minimal way to make it consistent. We
> present an alternative hypothesis: Reasoners create an explanation that
> resolves the inconsistency, and the explanation entails a revision or
> reinterpretation of the description. According to this principle of
> resolution, revision is consequent upon explanation. Hence, when
> individuals have such an explanation in mind, they should be faster than
> otherwise to modify assertions to make them consistent. Two experiments
> corroborated this prediction.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 147-156 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300003
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Spatial belief revision
>
> Authors:
> Knauff, M; Bucher, L; Krumnack, A; Nejasmic, J
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):147-156; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Belief revision is the process of changing one's beliefs when a newly
> acquired fact contradicts the existing belief set. Psychological
> research on belief revision mostly used conditional reasoning problems
> in which an inconsistency arises between a fact, contradicting a valid
> conclusion, and the conditional and categorical premises. In this paper,
> we present a new experimental paradigm in which we explore how people
> change their mind about the location of objects in space. The
> participants received statements that described the spatial relations
> between a set of objects. From these premises they drew a conclusion
> which then, in the next step, was contradicted by a new, irrefutable
> fact. The participants' task was to decide which of the objects to
> relocate and which one to leave at its initial position. We hypothesised
> that this spatial revision process is based on mental models and is
> affected by the functional asymmetry between reference objects (RO) and
> the located objects (LO) of spatial relations. The results from two
> experiments corroborate this hypothesis. We found that individuals have
> a strong preference to relocate the LO of the premises, but avoid
> relocating the RO. This is a novel finding and opens up new avenues of
> research on how humans mentally revise their beliefs about spatial
> relations between entities in the world.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 157-164 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300004
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Models and cognitive change in psychopathology
>
> Authors:
> Gangemi, A; Mancini, F; Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):157-164; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The hyper-emotion theory attributes psychological illnesses to emotions
> of aberrant intensity, which in turn prompt better reasoning about their
> causes. Two experiments in which participants drew their own conclusions
> from syllogistic premises tested this prediction. Individuals from the
> same populations as the experimental participants rated the
> believability of likely conclusions. One experiment compared patients
> with depression with controls, and the other experiment compared
> students scoring high on anxiety with controls. Controls tended to draw
> believable conclusions and not to draw unbelievable conclusions, and
> this belief bias was greater for invalid inferences. The clinical groups
> were better reasoners than the controls, and did not show belief bias.
> As our hypothesis predicted, they drew many more valid conclusions
> concerning their illness than controls drew valid believable
> conclusions. But, contrary to the hypothesis, they refrained from
> drawing invalid conclusions about neutral topics more than controls
> refrained from drawing invalid unbelievable conclusions.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 165-173 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300005
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Strategic changes in problem solving
>
> Authors:
> Lee, NYL; Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):165-173; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> One way to study how individuals reason to solve problems is to see how
> they develop strategies to solve a series of related problems. This
> paper accordingly presents a theory explaining how they do so: When
> individuals solve a series of problems, their initial moves are
> constrained solely by perceptual and cognitive characteristics of the
> problems. They deduce the consequences of tactical moves, whether or not
> these moves are successful in advancing them towards a solution. As they
> master these tactics, however, a strategic shift occurs. The deduced
> knowledge comes to constrain the generation of moves, through the
> discovery of global constraints. Three experiments investigating a
> series of matchstick problems corroborated the theory.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 174-182 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300006
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Chronometric evidence for the dual-process mental model theory of conditional
>
> Authors:
> Vergauwe, E; Gauffroy, C; Morsanyi, K; Dagry, I; Barrouillet, P
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):174-182; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The fact that adults exhibit a defective truth table when evaluating If
> p then q conditional statement and judge not signp cases as irrelevant
> for the truth value of the conditional has been considered as one of the
> main evidence against the mental model theory and in favour of Evans'
> (2007) suppositional account of conditional. If judgements of
> irrelevance result from some heuristic process, as the suppositional
> theory assumes, they should be rapid. By contrast, if they result from a
> demanding and time consuming fleshing out process, as our mental model
> theory assumes, irrelevant responses should be the slowest. In the
> present study, we analyse the time course of responses in a truth table
> task as a function of their nature and the interpretation of the
> conditional adopted by the participants. As our mental model theory
> predicts, irrelevant responses are the slowest, and response times are a
> direct function of the number of models each type of response involves.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 183-191 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300007
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Microgenetic evidence for the beneficial effects of feedback and practice on belief bias
>
> Authors:
> Ball, LJ
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):183-191; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its
> believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. The
> present study examined how belief bias might be ameliorated by providing
> evaluative feedback on responses (i.e., simple correct/incorrect
> assessments). The research utilised a microgenetic method involving
> intensive reasoning with belief-oriented syllogisms over a condensed
> time period (four testing sessions over consecutive days) so as to
> afford an understanding of the cognitive changes arising from the
> provision of evaluative feedback versus opportunities for mere practice.
> Belief bias was markedly reduced in the feedback condition relative to
> the no-feedback (practice) condition. However, logical responding
> improved over time for both conditions, indicating that normative
> evaluations can benefit from mere practice with belief-oriented
> deductive problems. Overall, the data support dual-process theories of
> belief bias, which embody analytic processes that can be modulated by
> external factors such as the provision of evaluative feedback.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 192-200 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300008
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Deductive reasoning and metalogical knowledge in preadolescence: A mental model appraisal
>
> Authors:
> Santamaria, C; Tse, PP; Moreno-Rios, S; Garcia-Madruga, JA
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):192-200; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> In this paper we analysed the metalogical and deductive inferential
> ability of a wide sample (1118 participants) of seventh and eighth grade
> school students (12-13 years old). We used two metareasoning tasks: an
> evaluation of propositional attitudes and a modal syllogistic task. Two
> additional deductive (propositional and syllogistic) reasoning tasks
> were used: a propositional inference task and a syllogistic construction
> task. We also tested the participants' working memory spans with the
> Reading Span test (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). We found a reliable
> effect of working memory for all the tasks, but an effect of school
> grade only for the metareasoning tasks. The results support the idea
> that metareasoning competencies make unusual progress during
> preadolescence. This development is crucial for individuals to engage in
> analytical reasoning.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 201-209 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300009
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive change in learning from text: Gesturing enhances the construction of the text mental model
>
> Authors:
> Cutica, I; Bucciarelli, M
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):201-209; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The literature on co-speech gestures has revealed a facilitating effect
> of gestures on both the listener's discourse comprehension and memory,
> and the speaker's discourse production. Bucciarelli (2007) and Cutica
> and Bucciarelli (2008) advanced a mental model account for the cognitive
> change produced by gestures: Gestures, whether observed or produced,
> favour the construction of a mental model of the discourse they
> accompany. In this paper, we focus on gesturing while studying, assuming
> that gesturing while reading a text also favours the construction of a
> mental model of the text. In two experiments we invited adult
> participants to study two scientific texts and confirmed the predictions
> deriving from the assumption that gestures favour the construction of a
> mental model of the text: Gesturing while studying resulted in more
> correct recollections and text-based inferences (Experiment 1) and loss
> of verbatim recall (Experiment 2).
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 210-219 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300010
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive change in insight problem solving: Initial model errors and counterexamples
>
> Authors:
> Murray, MA; Byrne, RMJ
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):210-219; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> We report the results of four experiments that examined the cognitive
> changes that occur in problem solvers' mental models of insight
> problems. The experiments showed that participants produced more correct
> solutions to insight problems that required single steps than multiple
> steps. Experiment 1 showed that their diagrams and explanations
> corresponded to initial model errors. Experiment 2 found more correct
> solutions for problems reworded to enable the retrieval of
> counterexamples to common assumptions. Experiment 3 found more correct
> solutions when physical props enabled the construction of a
> counterexample to the initial erroneous model and also to subsequent
> erroneous models. Experiment 4 showed more correct solutions when
> physical props limited the subsequent possibilities. The implications of
> the results for alternative theories of insight problem solving are
> discussed.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 220-228 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300011
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive change in mental models with experience in the domain of organic chemistry
>
> Authors:
> Hegarty, M; Stieff, M; Dixon, BL
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):220-228; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> We examined cognitive change in students' mental models, and
> consequently their problem-solving strategies, as a result of
> instruction in the domain of organic chemistry. Three groups of students
> received organic chemistry instruction that emphasised either imagistic
> strategies, analytic problem-solving strategies, or their combination.
> Before instruction, students' solution strategies were largely
> imagistic. After instruction, imagistic strategies comprised a minority
> of the strategies reported, indicating a switch from analogue mental
> models to more abstract representations. This switch was moderated by
> instruction and ability such that students who received analytic
> instruction used more analytic strategies after instruction and students
> with higher spatial ability used more imagistic strategies after
> instruction. Problem-solving success was associated with using a greater
> range of strategies. These results are consistent with research in other
> domains suggesting that imagistic mental models are associated with
> novelty, and as students gain more experience in a domain, they adopt
> domain-specific heuristics and rules when possible.
>
>
Wednesday, August 07, 2013
Article: Study: Messy desks get creative juices flowing
Study: Messy desks get creative juices flowing
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2013/08/07/news/messy-vs-clean-workplace
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Monday, August 05, 2013
Article: Scientists Develop Early-Warning System for Alzheimer's Disease
Scientists Develop Early-Warning System for Alzheimer's Disease
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=scientists-develop-early-warning-system-for-alzheimers
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Dorsolateral prefrontal contributions to human intelligence [feedly]
Shared via feedly // published on NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA - Web of Knowledge // visit site
Dorsolateral prefrontal contributions to human intelligence
Title: Dorsolateral prefrontal contributions to human intelligence
Author(s): Barbey, Aron K.; Colom, Roberto; Grafman, Jordan
Source: NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA, 51 (7): 1361-1369 JUN 2013
IDS#: 179RQ. ISSN: 0028-3932
Author(s): Barbey, Aron K.; Colom, Roberto; Grafman, Jordan
Source: NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA, 51 (7): 1361-1369 JUN 2013
IDS#: 179RQ. ISSN: 0028-3932
Saturday, August 03, 2013
Thursday, August 01, 2013
Article: NeuroImage | Vol 80, Pgs 1-544, (15 October, 2013)
NeuroImage | Vol 80, Pgs 1-544, (15 October, 2013)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/10538119/80
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Article: AAIDD Applauds SSA Rule Change
AAIDD Applauds SSA Rule Change
http://aaidd.org/news-policy/news/releases/2013/08/01/aaidd-applauds-ssa-rule-change
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