Knowledge Alert - PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

> Title:
> Trust, Punishment, and Cooperation Across 18 Societies: A Meta-Analysis
>
> Authors:
> Balliet, D; Van Lange, PAM
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):363-379; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Punishment promotes contributions to public goods, but recent evidence
> suggests that its effectiveness varies across societies. Prior
> theorizing suggests that cross-societal differences in trust play a key
> role in determining the effectiveness of punishment, as a form of social
> norm enforcement, to promote cooperation. One line of reasoning is that
> punishment promotes cooperation in low-trust societies, primarily
> because people in such societies expect their fellow members to
> contribute only if there are strong incentives to do so. Yet another
> line of reasoning is that high trust makes punishment work, presumably
> because in high-trust societies people may count on each other to make
> contributions to public goods and also enforce norm violations by
> punishing free riders. This poses a puzzle of punishment: Is punishment
> more effective in promoting cooperation in high- or low-trust societies?
> In the present article, we examine this puzzle of punishment in a
> quantitative review of 83 studies involving 7,361 participants across 18
> societies that examine the impact of punishment on cooperation in a
> public goods dilemma. The findings provide a clear answer: Punishment
> more strongly promotes cooperation in societies with high trust rather
> than low trust.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 380-394 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400002
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>
> Title:
> Perceiving Minds and Gods: How Mind Perception Enables, Constrains, and Is Triggered by Belief in Gods
>
> Authors:
> Gervais, WM
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):380-394; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Most people believe in the existence of empirically unverifiable gods.
> Despite apparent heterogeneity, people's conceptions of their gods
> center on predictable themes. Gods are overwhelmingly represented as
> intentional agents with (more or less) humanlike mental lives. This
> article reviews converging evidence suggesting that this regularity in
> god concepts exists in part because the ability to represent gods
> emerges as a cognitive by-product of the human capability to perceive
> minds. Basic human mind-perception abilities both facilitate and
> constrain belief in gods, with profound implications for individual
> differences in religious beliefs, implicit representations of
> supernatural agents, and the varieties of nonreligious experience.
> Furthermore, people react similarly to both reminders of gods and cues
> of social surveillance (e.g., audiences or video cameras), leading to
> interesting consequences in the domains of prosocial behavior, socially
> desirable responding, and self-awareness. Converging evidence indicates
> that mind perception is both cause and consequence of many religious
> beliefs.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 395-411 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400003
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>
> Title:
> Taking Stock of Unrealistic Optimism
>
> Authors:
> Shepperd, JA; Klein, WMP; Waters, EA; Weinstein, ND
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):395-411; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Researchers have used terms such as unrealistic optimism and optimistic
> bias to refer to concepts that are similar but not synonymous. Drawing
> from 3 decades of research, we discuss critically how researchers define
> unrealistic optimism, and we identify four types that reflect different
> measurement approaches: unrealistic absolute optimism at the individual
> and group levels and unrealistic comparative optimism at the individual
> and group levels. In addition, we discuss methodological criticisms
> leveled against research on unrealistic optimism and note that the
> criticisms are primarily relevant to only one type: the group form of
> unrealistic comparative optimism. We further clarify how the criticisms
> are not nearly as problematic as they might seem, even for unrealistic
> comparative optimism. Finally, we note boundary conditions on the
> different types of unrealistic optimism and reflect on five broad
> questions that deserve further attention.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 412-413 (Editorial Material)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400004
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>
> Title:
> Introduction to the Special Section on Advancing Science
>
> Authors:
> Spellman, BA
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):412-413; JUL 2013
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 414-423 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400005
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>
> Title:
> An Additional Future for Psychological Science
>
> Authors:
> Jost, JT
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):414-423; JUL 2013
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 424-432 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400006
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>
> Title:
> PsychDisclosure.org: Grassroots Support for Reforming Reporting Standards in Psychology
>
> Authors:
> Lebel, EP; Borsboom, D; Giner-Sorolla, R; Hasselman, F; Peters, KR;
> Ratliff, KA; Smith, CT
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):424-432; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> There is currently an unprecedented level of doubt regarding the
> reliability of research findings in psychology. Many recommendations
> have been made to improve the current situation. In this article, we
> report results from PsychDisclosure.org, a novel open-science initiative
> that provides a platform for authors of recently published articles to
> disclose four methodological design specification details that are not
> required to be disclosed under current reporting standards but that are
> critical for accurate interpretation and evaluation of reported
> findings. Grassroots sentimentas manifested in the positive and
> appreciative response to our initiativeindicates that psychologists want
> to see changes made at the systemic level regarding disclosure of such
> methodological details. Almost 50% of contacted researchers disclosed
> the requested design specifications for the four methodological
> categories (excluded subjects, nonreported conditions and measures, and
> sample size determination). Disclosed information provided by
> participating authors also revealed several instances of questionable
> editorial practices, which need to be thoroughly examined and redressed.
> On the basis of these results, we argue that the time is now for
> mandatory methods disclosure statements for all psychology journals,
> which would be an important step forward in improving the reliability of
> findings in psychology.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 433-444 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400007
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>
> Title:
> Advancing Science Through Collaborative Data Sharing and Synthesis
>
> Authors:
> Perrino, T; Howe, G; Sperling, A; Beardslee, W; Sandler, I; Shern, D;
> Pantin, H; Kaupert, S; Cano, N; Cruden, G; Bandiera, F; Brown, CH
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):433-444; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The demand for researchers to share their data has increased
> dramatically in recent years. There is a need to replicate and confirm
> scientific findings to bolster confidence in many research areas. Data
> sharing also serves the critical function of allowing synthesis of
> findings across trials. As innovative statistical methods have helped
> resolve barriers to synthesis analyses, data sharing and synthesis can
> help answer research questions that cannot be answered by individual
> trials alone. However, the sharing of data among researchers remains
> challenging and infrequent. This article aims to (a) increase support
> for data sharing and synthesis collaborations among researchers to
> advance scientific knowledge and (b) provide a model for establishing
> these collaborations using the example of the ongoing National Institute
> of Mental Health's Collaborative Data Synthesis on Adolescent Depression
> Trials. This study brings together datasets from existing prevention and
> treatment trials in adolescent depression, as well as researchers and
> stakeholders, to answer questions about for whom interventions work and
> by what pathways interventions have their effects. This is critical to
> improving interventions, including increasing knowledge about
> intervention efficacy among minority populations, or what we call
> scientific equity. The collaborative model described is relevant to
> fields with research questions that can only be addressed by
> synthesizing individual-level data.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 445-454 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400008
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>
> Title:
> The Pervasive Problem With Placebos in Psychology: Why Active Control Groups Are Not Sufficient to Rule Out Placebo Effects
>
> Authors:
> Boot, WR; Simons, DJ; Stothart, C; Stutts, C
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):445-454; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> To draw causal conclusions about the efficacy of a psychological
> intervention, researchers must compare the treatment condition with a
> control group that accounts for improvements caused by factors other
> than the treatment. Using an active control helps to control for the
> possibility that improvement by the experimental group resulted from a
> placebo effect. Although active control groups are superior to
> no-contact controls, only when the active control group has the same
> expectation of improvement as the experimental group can we attribute
> differential improvements to the potency of the treatment. Despite the
> need to match expectations between treatment and control groups, almost
> no psychological interventions do so. This failure to control for
> expectations is not a minor omissionit is a fundamental design flaw that
> potentially undermines any causal inference. We illustrate these
> principles with a detailed example from the video-game-training
> literature showing how the use of an active control group does not
> eliminate expectation differences. The problem permeates other
> interventions as well, including those targeting mental health,
> cognition, and educational achievement. Fortunately, measuring
> expectations and adopting alternative experimental designs makes it
> possible to control for placebo effects, thereby increasing confidence
> in the causal efficacy of psychological interventions.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 455-473 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400009
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>
> Title:
> How "Paternalistic" Is Spatial Perception? Why Wearing a Heavy Backpack Doesn't- and Couldn't-Make Hills Look Steeper
>
> Authors:
> Firestone, C
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):455-473; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> A chief goal of perception is to help us navigate our environment.
> According to a rich and ambitious theory of spatial perception, the
> visual system achieves this goal not by aiming to accurately depict the
> external world, but instead by actively distorting the environment's
> perceived spatial layout to bias action selection toward favorable
> outcomes. Scores of experimental results have supported this
> viewincluding, famously, a report that wearing a heavy backpack makes
> hills look steeper. This perspective portrays the visual system as
> unapologetically paternalistic: Backpacks make hills harder to climb, so
> vision steepens them to discourage ascent. The paternalistic theory of
> spatial perception has, understandably, attracted controversy; if true,
> it would radically revise our understanding of how and why we see. Here,
> this view is subjected to a kind and degree of scrutiny it has yet to
> face. After characterizing and motivating the case for paternalistic
> vision, I expose several unexplored defects in its theoretical
> framework, arguing that extant accounts of how and why spatial
> perception is ability-sensitive are deeply problematic and that
> perceptual phenomenology belies the view's claims. The paternalistic
> account of spatial perception not only isn't trueit couldn't be true,
> even if its empirical findings were accepted at face value.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 474-483 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000321493400010
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>
> Title:
> An Embodied Approach to Perception: By What Units Are Visual Perceptions Scaled?
>
> Authors:
> Proffitt, DR
>
> Source:
> *PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE*, 8 (4):474-483; JUL 2013
>
> Abstract:
> When humans perceive the environment, angular units of visual
> information must be transformed into units appropriate for the
> specification of such parameters of surface layout as extent, size, and
> orientation. Our embodied approach to perception proposes that these
> scaling units derive from the body. For example, hand size is relevant
> for scaling the size of a strawberry, whereas an extent across a meadow
> is scaled by the amount of walking required to traverse it. In his
> article, Firestone (2013, this issue) argued that our approach is wrong;
> in fact, he argued that it must be wrong. This reply to Firestone's
> critique is organized into three parts, which address the following
> questions: (a) What is the fundamental question motivating our approach?
> (b) How does our approach answer this question? (c) How can we address
> Firestone's arguments against our approach? A point-by-point critique of
> Firestone's arguments is presented. Three conclusions are drawn: (a)
> Most of Firestone's arguments reflect a misunderstanding of our
> approach, (b) none of his arguments are the fatal flaws in our approach
> that he believes them to be, and (c) there are good reasons to believe
> that perception-just like any other biological function-is a phenotypic
> expression.
>
>
>