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Kevin McGrew, PhD
Educational Psychologist
Director, IAP
www.themindhub.com
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>
>
> *Pages: 131-138 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300001
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Mental models and cognitive change
>
> Authors:
> Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):131-138; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The theory of mental models owes its origins to Peirce's logic in the
> nineteenth century and to Craik's psychological research during the
> Second World War. This Special Issue marks the 30th anniversary of a
> book that tried to pull these and other strands together into a unified
> approach to comprehension and reasoning: Mental Models. The principal
> assumption of the theory is that individuals reason by trying to
> envisage the possibilities compatible with what they know or believe.
> The present paper reviews recent developments in the theory. It
> describes the issues that arise as a result of cognitive changes both in
> the short term and in the long term. And it introduces the set of papers
> in this Special Issue that explore such changes in mind.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 139-146 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300002
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive changes from explanations
>
> Authors:
> Khemlani, S; Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):139-146; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> When individuals detect that a description is inconsistent, theorists
> from William James onwards have argued that a cognitive change occurs:
> They modify the description in a minimal way to make it consistent. We
> present an alternative hypothesis: Reasoners create an explanation that
> resolves the inconsistency, and the explanation entails a revision or
> reinterpretation of the description. According to this principle of
> resolution, revision is consequent upon explanation. Hence, when
> individuals have such an explanation in mind, they should be faster than
> otherwise to modify assertions to make them consistent. Two experiments
> corroborated this prediction.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 147-156 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300003
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Spatial belief revision
>
> Authors:
> Knauff, M; Bucher, L; Krumnack, A; Nejasmic, J
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):147-156; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> Belief revision is the process of changing one's beliefs when a newly
> acquired fact contradicts the existing belief set. Psychological
> research on belief revision mostly used conditional reasoning problems
> in which an inconsistency arises between a fact, contradicting a valid
> conclusion, and the conditional and categorical premises. In this paper,
> we present a new experimental paradigm in which we explore how people
> change their mind about the location of objects in space. The
> participants received statements that described the spatial relations
> between a set of objects. From these premises they drew a conclusion
> which then, in the next step, was contradicted by a new, irrefutable
> fact. The participants' task was to decide which of the objects to
> relocate and which one to leave at its initial position. We hypothesised
> that this spatial revision process is based on mental models and is
> affected by the functional asymmetry between reference objects (RO) and
> the located objects (LO) of spatial relations. The results from two
> experiments corroborate this hypothesis. We found that individuals have
> a strong preference to relocate the LO of the premises, but avoid
> relocating the RO. This is a novel finding and opens up new avenues of
> research on how humans mentally revise their beliefs about spatial
> relations between entities in the world.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 157-164 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300004
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Models and cognitive change in psychopathology
>
> Authors:
> Gangemi, A; Mancini, F; Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):157-164; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The hyper-emotion theory attributes psychological illnesses to emotions
> of aberrant intensity, which in turn prompt better reasoning about their
> causes. Two experiments in which participants drew their own conclusions
> from syllogistic premises tested this prediction. Individuals from the
> same populations as the experimental participants rated the
> believability of likely conclusions. One experiment compared patients
> with depression with controls, and the other experiment compared
> students scoring high on anxiety with controls. Controls tended to draw
> believable conclusions and not to draw unbelievable conclusions, and
> this belief bias was greater for invalid inferences. The clinical groups
> were better reasoners than the controls, and did not show belief bias.
> As our hypothesis predicted, they drew many more valid conclusions
> concerning their illness than controls drew valid believable
> conclusions. But, contrary to the hypothesis, they refrained from
> drawing invalid conclusions about neutral topics more than controls
> refrained from drawing invalid unbelievable conclusions.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 165-173 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300005
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Strategic changes in problem solving
>
> Authors:
> Lee, NYL; Johnson-Laird, PN
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):165-173; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> One way to study how individuals reason to solve problems is to see how
> they develop strategies to solve a series of related problems. This
> paper accordingly presents a theory explaining how they do so: When
> individuals solve a series of problems, their initial moves are
> constrained solely by perceptual and cognitive characteristics of the
> problems. They deduce the consequences of tactical moves, whether or not
> these moves are successful in advancing them towards a solution. As they
> master these tactics, however, a strategic shift occurs. The deduced
> knowledge comes to constrain the generation of moves, through the
> discovery of global constraints. Three experiments investigating a
> series of matchstick problems corroborated the theory.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 174-182 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300006
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Chronometric evidence for the dual-process mental model theory of conditional
>
> Authors:
> Vergauwe, E; Gauffroy, C; Morsanyi, K; Dagry, I; Barrouillet, P
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):174-182; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The fact that adults exhibit a defective truth table when evaluating If
> p then q conditional statement and judge not signp cases as irrelevant
> for the truth value of the conditional has been considered as one of the
> main evidence against the mental model theory and in favour of Evans'
> (2007) suppositional account of conditional. If judgements of
> irrelevance result from some heuristic process, as the suppositional
> theory assumes, they should be rapid. By contrast, if they result from a
> demanding and time consuming fleshing out process, as our mental model
> theory assumes, irrelevant responses should be the slowest. In the
> present study, we analyse the time course of responses in a truth table
> task as a function of their nature and the interpretation of the
> conditional adopted by the participants. As our mental model theory
> predicts, irrelevant responses are the slowest, and response times are a
> direct function of the number of models each type of response involves.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 183-191 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300007
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Microgenetic evidence for the beneficial effects of feedback and practice on belief bias
>
> Authors:
> Ball, LJ
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):183-191; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its
> believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. The
> present study examined how belief bias might be ameliorated by providing
> evaluative feedback on responses (i.e., simple correct/incorrect
> assessments). The research utilised a microgenetic method involving
> intensive reasoning with belief-oriented syllogisms over a condensed
> time period (four testing sessions over consecutive days) so as to
> afford an understanding of the cognitive changes arising from the
> provision of evaluative feedback versus opportunities for mere practice.
> Belief bias was markedly reduced in the feedback condition relative to
> the no-feedback (practice) condition. However, logical responding
> improved over time for both conditions, indicating that normative
> evaluations can benefit from mere practice with belief-oriented
> deductive problems. Overall, the data support dual-process theories of
> belief bias, which embody analytic processes that can be modulated by
> external factors such as the provision of evaluative feedback.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 192-200 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300008
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Deductive reasoning and metalogical knowledge in preadolescence: A mental model appraisal
>
> Authors:
> Santamaria, C; Tse, PP; Moreno-Rios, S; Garcia-Madruga, JA
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):192-200; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> In this paper we analysed the metalogical and deductive inferential
> ability of a wide sample (1118 participants) of seventh and eighth grade
> school students (12-13 years old). We used two metareasoning tasks: an
> evaluation of propositional attitudes and a modal syllogistic task. Two
> additional deductive (propositional and syllogistic) reasoning tasks
> were used: a propositional inference task and a syllogistic construction
> task. We also tested the participants' working memory spans with the
> Reading Span test (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). We found a reliable
> effect of working memory for all the tasks, but an effect of school
> grade only for the metareasoning tasks. The results support the idea
> that metareasoning competencies make unusual progress during
> preadolescence. This development is crucial for individuals to engage in
> analytical reasoning.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 201-209 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300009
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive change in learning from text: Gesturing enhances the construction of the text mental model
>
> Authors:
> Cutica, I; Bucciarelli, M
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):201-209; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> The literature on co-speech gestures has revealed a facilitating effect
> of gestures on both the listener's discourse comprehension and memory,
> and the speaker's discourse production. Bucciarelli (2007) and Cutica
> and Bucciarelli (2008) advanced a mental model account for the cognitive
> change produced by gestures: Gestures, whether observed or produced,
> favour the construction of a mental model of the discourse they
> accompany. In this paper, we focus on gesturing while studying, assuming
> that gesturing while reading a text also favours the construction of a
> mental model of the text. In two experiments we invited adult
> participants to study two scientific texts and confirmed the predictions
> deriving from the assumption that gestures favour the construction of a
> mental model of the text: Gesturing while studying resulted in more
> correct recollections and text-based inferences (Experiment 1) and loss
> of verbatim recall (Experiment 2).
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 210-219 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300010
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive change in insight problem solving: Initial model errors and counterexamples
>
> Authors:
> Murray, MA; Byrne, RMJ
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):210-219; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> We report the results of four experiments that examined the cognitive
> changes that occur in problem solvers' mental models of insight
> problems. The experiments showed that participants produced more correct
> solutions to insight problems that required single steps than multiple
> steps. Experiment 1 showed that their diagrams and explanations
> corresponded to initial model errors. Experiment 2 found more correct
> solutions for problems reworded to enable the retrieval of
> counterexamples to common assumptions. Experiment 3 found more correct
> solutions when physical props enabled the construction of a
> counterexample to the initial erroneous model and also to subsequent
> erroneous models. Experiment 4 showed more correct solutions when
> physical props limited the subsequent possibilities. The implications of
> the results for alternative theories of insight problem solving are
> discussed.
>
> ========================================================================
>
>
> *Pages: 220-228 (Article)
> *View Full Record: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=CCC&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=CCC:000322302300011
> *Order Full Text [ ]
>
> Title:
> Cognitive change in mental models with experience in the domain of organic chemistry
>
> Authors:
> Hegarty, M; Stieff, M; Dixon, BL
>
> Source:
> *JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*, 25 (2):220-228; SI MAR 1 2013
>
> Abstract:
> We examined cognitive change in students' mental models, and
> consequently their problem-solving strategies, as a result of
> instruction in the domain of organic chemistry. Three groups of students
> received organic chemistry instruction that emphasised either imagistic
> strategies, analytic problem-solving strategies, or their combination.
> Before instruction, students' solution strategies were largely
> imagistic. After instruction, imagistic strategies comprised a minority
> of the strategies reported, indicating a switch from analogue mental
> models to more abstract representations. This switch was moderated by
> instruction and ability such that students who received analytic
> instruction used more analytic strategies after instruction and students
> with higher spatial ability used more imagistic strategies after
> instruction. Problem-solving success was associated with using a greater
> range of strategies. These results are consistent with research in other
> domains suggesting that imagistic mental models are associated with
> novelty, and as students gain more experience in a domain, they adopt
> domain-specific heuristics and rules when possible.
>
>
Intelligent Insights on Intelligence Theories and Tests
